Recently, attention has been drawn to gross private capital flows (the memorandum items in the table), which indicate a sharp slowdown in acquisitions by U.S. residents of assets abroad, rather than an increase in flows of U.S. liabilities to foreign private residents. These data have been used to suggest-inappropriately, we think-that the strength of the dollar is the consequence not of an increase in foreign demand for dollars, but rather of a decrease in U.S. demand for foreign currencies, and that domestic and not foreign investors financed the surge in U.S. investment during 1983-84. Table 2 is 
The data can be adjusted still further for interbank transactions, in order to avoid attaching significance to whether U.S. banking offices reduce their claims or increase their liabilities to offshore banking offices. Changes in interbank flows (lines 11 and 23) have been major components of the shifts in gross private capital outflows and inflows over the past four years. The changes in interbank flows were influenced in part by concerns about capital adequacy and financial market developments in late 1983 and 1984, which led U.S.-owned banks to reduce their participation in Eurodollar interbank markets, as both lenders and borrowers; these concerns also contributed to reductions in the Eurodollar deposits of U.S. nonbanks at the foreign offices of both foreign-and U.S -owned banks. Such developments slowed the growth of both claims and As a final and fundamental point, regardless of the data inadequacies and conceptual difficulties in interpreting the extent to which U.S. residents have been liquidating claims on foreigners rather than extending liabilities, the interpretation of the current account deficit is unambiguous. The United States is currently absorbing more goods and services than it is producing, and the difference is being supplied by the rest of the world.
Capital Flows and Hypotheses about the Dollar's Appreciation
Three hypotheses have been advanced to explain the strong ex ante net capital inflow into the United States in recent years and, as a consequence, the substantial appreciation of the dollar. One hypothesis emphasizes the safe haven motive, that is, the shifting of assets into the United States, or into dollars, because of increased political or economic instability abroad. The other two focus on changes in real interest differentials. One is based on the observation that the after-tax return on real capital in the United States has risen; the other argues that the change in real interest differentials has been primarily associated with the budget deficit and its impact on the rates of return on financial assets. In light of the Reagan administration's tax and regulatory changes, the large shift in the U.S. structural budget deficit, and the international debt crisis, each of these three hypotheses undoubtedly has some validity. The focus of this section is on whether the ex post composition of U.S. capital flows sheds much light on the relative importance of the three hypotheses.
I'he short answer to this question is no. Consider first the safe haven hypothesis. One might attempt to measure the importance of the safe haven motive by examining the actual capital inflow from residents of countries experiencing economic or political crises. As shown in table 4, there have been substantial increases in liabilities of banks in the United States to nonbank residents of Latin America, particularly Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. But the largest increases occurred in 1982 and may primarily reflect a shift in the location of deposits as a result of the establishment of IBFs. There are several other difficulties, as well, in using balance of payments data to assess the importance of the safe haven motive. First, asset holders from "unsafe" countries might invest in dollar assets in the Eurodollar markets; the U.S. international transactions accounts would then show inflows from Switzerland, the United Kingdom, or the Caribbean, rather than direct inflows from the countries experiencing crises. Second, investors seeking safe haven in the United States may desire anonymity and may therefore invest in ways that are not reported in the U.S. international transactions accounts. And, finally, ex post capital flows out of an "unsafe" country into the United States or elsewhere can differ from ex ante desires to move capital. Ex post flows are limited by how fast the current account balance of the "unsafe" country adjusts, or how much it draws down official reserves or borrows.
Next, consider the difficulty of using data on U.S. capital inflows to assess how strongly the appreciation of the dollar has been related to the increase in the after-tax return on physical capital in the United States. It has been suggested that such an assessment should focus on whether there has been an increase in direct investment inflows or purchases of corporate stocks, rather than investment in other financial assets. But the likely pattern of flows is ambiguous, because an increase in the real return on physical capital in the United States can induce U.S. residents to borrow in financial markets in order to obtain funds for real investment.
Rates of return on financial assets would tend to rise, and foreigners might well be observed increasing their holdings of financial claims on U.S. residents, even though the initial change was an increase in return on physical capital. Conversely, an increase in foreign direct investment in the United States may well result from changes in financial market conditions and funding decisions, rather than changes in expected capital productivity and real investment decisions. Table 5 Foreign net purchases of equities are also not necessarily correlated with increases in capital productivity in the United States. News of an increase in capital productivity would have an immediate impact on stock market prices, providing capital gains for existing stockholders. Transactions, on the other hand, reflect differences of opinion about capital productivity or prospective changes in equity prices. The lack of large foreign net purchases of U.S. equities may merely indicate that foreigners are no more optimistic on average than U.S. residents about future capital productivity or equity prices in the United States.
In conclusion, the composition of U.S. capital flows offers little evidence on the relative importance of various forces that might explain the recent appreciation of the dollar. Nor does the overall size of the net private capital inflow necessarily measure the upward pressures on the value of the currency. If the dollar dropped sharply tomorrow, the United States would still run a substantial current account deficit this year and, barring large official dollar purchases, would still record large net private capital inflows.
Concerns about U.S. Net International Indebtedness
Should we be concerned about the U.S. net international investment position per se,5 apart from being concerned about the underlying causes of the shift toward a position of large U.S. net international indebtedness? Three areas of possible concern are the implications of the net interest payments to foreigners to service U.S. debts, the vulnerability of the U.S. economy to future shocks, and the constraints that policy authorities may face in responding to future shocks.
Whether future interest payments will be a serious burden depends largely on whether the dollar's appreciation and the consequent current account deficit are the result of increased incentives to invest in U.S. physical capital. When the productivity of capital increases in one country, a reallocation of the world's investable resources toward that country is an implication of a Pareto efficient response that raises prospective consumption paths worldwide, even though in the short run it also raises the net international indebtedness of the country whose productivity has increased.
Alternatively, when the growing debt is counterpart to increased current consumption, welfare judgments require a weighing of current benefits against future costs.6 One significant cost of consuming more currently is that with an unchanged future capital stock, the necessity of servicing the debt implies lower real income in the future. Other concerns are that increased U.S. net international indebtedness may increase the vulnerability of the IJ.S. economy to future shocks or constrain policy authorities in responding to future shocks. To the extent that the risks perceived by foreigners in holding net claims on the U.S. economy are different from the risks perceived by U.S. residents, it is quite conceivable that a shock that changes perceptions of risk would have impacts on market-clearing exchange rates or interest rates that vary directly with the size of U.S. international indebtedness.
The official Department of Commerce data, traditionally reported in August issues
To push the analysis further requires an assumption about whether market participants have behaved rationally in driving the dollar to its present high value. If it is assumed that the dollar has been riding an irrational bubble (or even the type of rational bubble that Jeffrey Frankel discusses in his paper in this volume), then we have little basis for modeling the response of market participants, but there is a presumption that the dollar could depreciate sharply in response to an unfavorable shock.
The alternative assumption is that the present value of the dollar is rational and bubblefree. In that case, it is feasible to provide a modelbased analysis of whether the U.S. economy's vulnerability to shocks will increase as its net international indebtedness rises. One appealing analytic framework is the steady-state growth paradigm. This suggests that the equilibrium long-run real exchange rate must produce a balance of trade in goods plus noncapital services so that the current account deficit equals net investment income payments on the external debt. Under these conditions, net international indebtedness grows at the rate of interest, which equals the steady-state growth rate.
Note that in this framework, the path to long-run equilibrium does not require the dollar to depreciate sufficiently to generate a trade surplus with which to meet the net interest payments on the external debt. The United States continues to borrow to meet its net interest payments. Thus it is possible that any level of external debt is consistent with an equilibrium level of the exchange rate.
Even if equilibrium may exist with different levels of indebtedness, this does not mean that the vulnerability of the economy to shocks is independent of the level of indebtedness.7 The experiences of debt-7. A number of open-economy macro models have provided insights into conditions that define the equilibrium long-run real exchange rate in a stationary state; for a recent innovative example, see William H. Branson, Arminio Fraga, and Robert A. Johnson, burdened developing countries in recent years provide dramatic evidence that an economy's vulnerability to shocks can indeed be very sensitive to the level of its net international debt, as well as to the composition of its external assets and liabilities.8
Before drawing inferences from the experiences of less developed countries, however, it is worth emphasizing two major differences between the United States and the debt-burdened developing countries. First, the United States does not appear to be building up large debts denominated in foreign currencies, although not much is known about exposure through forward exchange contracts and other measures that escape our data collection networks. And, second, creditor confidence in the ability of the United States to service its international debts is enhanced by a large and diversified U.S. tradable goods sector, even though that sector is being placed under increasing strains by the prolonged strength of the dollar. These considerations temper any judgments about U.S. vulnerability to shocks. But a convincing analysis would require more successful models of the exchange rate than are now available.
The Possibility of a Gradual, Prolonged Depreciation
In an expanding world economy, it is plausible that the United States could sustain aforever-growing net international indebtedness, provided 8. Some have argued that the volatility of a country's exchange rate in response to shocks depends on the mix between its short-and long-term liabilities to foreigners. We do not find this argument convincing, however, based on the lack of a close correspondence between the maturity and the liquidity of assets. Many short-term investments, such as time deposits, may be less liquid than assets classified as long-term; in particular, government bonds and corporate stocks can be sold quickly, while direct investors can manipulate leads and lags on their accounts. Moreover, changes in market expectations could lead to large shifts in exchange rates even if all financial assets were illiquid, partly because opportunities exist to speculate in forward exchange markets or through the use of currency options.
that it stabilized at a relatively low share of foreign net worth.9 As a condition for U.S. net indebtedness to stabilize (and perhaps eventually begin to decline) as a share of foreign net worth, it seems appropriate to assume that the balance of trade in goods plus noncapital services must move out of deficit. The U.S. current account deficit would then be no larger than the deficit on net investment income payments, so that U.S. net international indebtedness would expand no faster than the interest rate and hence, presumably, no faster than foreign net worth.
It is difficult to imagine that the trade deficit ( Unless one rejects the implicit hypothesis that the assumptions underlying the calculations represent a consistent and rational forecast, 1I1 the plausibility of sustaining a gradual 3 or 4 percent annual decline in the dollar over a prolonged period hinges on whether rational foreigners would willingly accumulate the implied stocks of net claims on the United 11. The calculations are illustrative and subject to criticism on several counts. One basic criticism is the use of a very simplified short-term forecasting model in which imports and exports are determined independently and as functions only of aggregate expenditure and relative price, with no role for productive capacity or other supply-side variables. In such models an exchange rate change has the same predicted long-run effect on net international indebtedness regardless of whether the change in the trade balance in the short run reflects a change in consumption relative to production or a change in investment relative to production. The assumptions might also be challenged for suggesting that the two regions could grow and inflate at the same rates while the dollar depreciates, although this approximates what many forecasters are now projecting.
States. As a ballpark estimate, private foreigners' net holdings of the public sector debts of their own countries, plus claims on the United States, plus tangible assets, would be around $25 trillion equivalent after thirteen years if the dollar depreciated at 3 percent per year;'2 thus, private foreigners' net claims on the United States might amount to no more than 10 percent of their net worth. Slightly more rapid rates of depreciation would imply somewhat lower portfolio shares. Arguments that a gradual, prolonged depreciation or "soft landing" is conceivable can be translated into arguments that private foreigners could rationally desire to build their portfolio shares to such levels. 13 
Conclusions
Our examination of the composition of recent U.S. international capital flows reveals that the unadjusted data are misleading. Appropriate adjustments indicate that the counterpart to the widening U.S. current account deficit has been a combination of a slowdown in the growth of U.S. claims on foreigners and a significant increase in the growth of U.S. liabilities to foreigners. Capital flow data are also inadequate to evaluate the hypotheses that have been advanced to explain the appreciation of the dollar. What can be reliably inferred from the international accounts is that the United States is absorbing substantially more goods and services than it is producing, and that the difference is being supplied by the rest of the world.
To the extent that this accumulation of net debt to foreigners does not 12. The public debt of the Group of Ten countries other than the United States can be projected to exceed $9 trillion-equivalent in thirteen years if general government debts remain about half as large as (or grow at the same rate as) gross domestic products, and if nominal dollar-equivalent GDPs grow at 10 percent annually (3 percent real, 7 percent prices translated into dollars). Moreover, if private foreign net saving remains in the neighborhood of 13 percent of GDP, cumulative savings over the 13 years will approach $19 trillion, of which about $9 trillion would be used to acquire additional claims on public sector-s plus claims on the United States, while about $10 trillion would finance investments in tangible assets. lead to investment to increase productive capacity, servicing that debt in the future will require lower U.S. absorption. Whether increased international indebtedness will also leave the U.S. economy more vulnerable to shocks is difficult to analyze without a better understanding of exchange rate behavior.
There is a possibility that a substantial depreciation of the dollar may occur only gradually and over a prolonged period of time. The calculations that we present to support this possibility, however, are not intended as a forecast. Nor is the nonalarmist tone of our conclusions intended to belittle strong concerns about the high dollar, its underlying causes, and the present state of the world economy.
